India’s latest diplomatic overture to Afghanistan’s Taliban government signals a significant shift in how it sees the geopolitical reality in the region.
This comes more than three years after India suffered a major strategic and diplomatic blow Kabul fell to the Taliban.
Two decades of investment in Afghan democracy – through military training, scholarships and landmark projects like building a new parliament – were quickly undone. The collapse also paved the way for greater influence from regional rivals, particularly Pakistan and China, eroding India’s strategic foothold and raising new security concerns.
However, last week signaled a shift. India’s top diplomat Vikram Misri met Taliban acting foreign minister Amir Khan Muttaqi in Dubai – the highest level of engagement since the fall of Kabul. The Taliban have expressed interest in strengthening political and economic ties with India, calling it a “significant regional and economic power”.
The talks reportedly focused on expanding trade and exploiting Iran’s Chabahar port, which India is developing to bypass Pakistan’s ports of Karachi and Gwadar.
How important is this meeting? Delhi has now given the Taliban leadership the de facto legitimacy it has sought from the international community since it returned to power, Michael Kugelman of the Wilson Center, a US think-tank, told me.
“The fact that this treatment is coming from India – a nation that has never had friendly relations with the Taliban before, makes this even more significant and also a diplomatic triumph for the Taliban,” he says.
Since the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan, countries have adopted different approaches to the regime, balancing diplomatic engagement with human rights and security concerns. China, for example, has gone a long way: actively engaging with the Taliban, focusing on security and economic interests, and even ambassador in the country.
No country has officially recognized the Taliban government, but up to 40 countries maintain some form of diplomatic or informal relations with it.
That’s why experts like Jayant Prasad, India’s former ambassador to Afghanistan, are more cautious about India’s reach.
For the past three years, he says, India has maintained contact with the Taliban through diplomats abroad. India closed its consulates in Afghanistan during the civil war in the 1990s and reopened them in 2002 after the war ended. “We didn’t want this break to develop [again]so we wanted to engage. It’s quite simply a step up in relationships,” he says.
India has “historical and civilizational ties” with Afghanistan, Foreign Minister S Jaishankar told parliament in 2023. India has invested more than $3bn (£2.46bn) in over 500 projects across Afghanistan, including roads, power lines, dams, hospitals and clinics. It has trained Afghan officers, awarded thousands of scholarships to students and built a new parliament building.
This reflects an enduring geopolitical reality. “Regardless of the nature of the regime in Kabul – monarchical, communist or Islamist – there is a natural warmth between Delhi and Kabul,” The Indian Express recorded.
Mr. Kugelman echoes that sentiment. “India has an important legacy as a donor of development and humanitarian aid in Afghanistan, which has translated into public goodwill with the Afghan public that Delhi is keen not to lose,” he says.
Interestingly, relations with Delhi appear to be easing amid rising tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Pakistan claims that the hard-line Pakistani Taliban (TTP) operate from a sanctuary in Afghanistan.
Last July, Pakistan’s Defense Minister Khawaja Asif told the BBC that Pakistan would continue attacks on Afghanistan as part of the fight against terrorism. Days before talks between India and the Taliban, Pakistani airstrikes killed dozens in eastern Afghanistan, according to the Afghan government. The Taliban government condemned the attacks as a violation of its sovereignty.
This marks a sharp decline in relations since the fall of Kabul in 2021, when Pakistan’s top intelligence official was among the first foreign guests to meet the Taliban regime. At the time, many saw the fall of Kabul as a strategic step backwards for India.
“While Pakistan is not the only factor driving India’s intensifying attack on the Taliban, the truth is that Delhi is winning a major victory in its eternal competition with Pakistan by tapping into a key long-standing Pakistani asset that has now turned against its former patron,” says Mr. Kugelman.
There are other reasons that encourage outreach. India aims to strengthen connectivity and access to Central Asia, which it cannot reach directly by land due to Pakistan’s denial of transit rights. Experts say Afghanistan is key to this goal. One strategy is to work with Iran to develop the Chabahar port to improve access to Central Asia via Afghanistan.
“It is easier for Delhi to focus on the Afghan component of this plan by working more closely with the Taliban leadership, which is fully behind India’s plans as they would help boost Afghanistan’s trade and connectivity,” says Mr. Kugelman.
Clearly, India’s recent outreach helps advance its core interests in Taliban-led Afghanistan: thwarting terrorist threats to India, deepening ties with Iran and Central Asia, maintaining public goodwill by aiding and abetting a struggling Pakistan.
What about the cons?
“The main risk of strengthening ties with the Taliban is the Taliban themselves. We are talking about a violent and brutal actor with close ties to international – including Pakistani – terrorist groups, which has not done much to reform itself from what it was in the 1990s,” says Mr. Kugelman.
“India can hope that by keeping the Taliban at bay, so to speak, the Taliban is less likely to undermine India or its interests. And that may be true. But at the end of the day, can you really trust an actor like the Taliban? It will be a troubling question hovering over India as it continues to proceed cautiously with this complex relationship.”
Mr. Prasad sees no downside to India’s current involvement in Afghanistan, despite concerns about the Taliban’s treatment of women. “The Taliban are in complete control. Letting the Taliban stew in their own juices will not help the Afghan people. Some engagement with the international community could put pressure on the government to improve its behavior.”
“Remember, the Taliban crave recognition,” says Mr. Prasad. “They know that this will happen only after internal reforms.” Like returning women to public life and restoring their rights to education, work and political participation.
