The Israeli army underestimated Hamas’s abilities before October 7th an attack that caused a war in Gaza, finds a probe

The Israeli Army Investigation determined that Hamas He managed to perform the most deadly terrorist attack in Israeli history on October 7, 2023, because the much more powerful Israeli army misjudged the intent of the militant group and underestimated its abilities.

“A large -scale surprise attack was not considered a likely scenario, because of the fundamental misunderstanding of the enemy,” the army said in a summary of findings, which were published on Thursday. “IDF and intelligence agencies perceived Hamas as a limited and reactive threat and assumed that an early warning would precede any major offensive.”

The findings could press Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to launch a broad -asked wider investigation to examine the political decision -making that preceded a terrorist attack, which launched War in Gaza.

The Prime Minister did not take responsibility for Israel’s strategy in the years that led to the attack, saying that he would answer heavy questions only after the war, which paused for almost six weeks by tightening cease-fire. Despite the public pressure, including families of approximately 1,200 people killed in October 7, and 251 taken as hostages in Gaza, Netanyahu resisted calls for the investigating commission.

The main discoveries of the army were that the most powerful and most modern military and sophisticated army in the region read Hamas’s intentions, underestimated his abilities and was completely clumsy to the attack of the surprise of thousands of hard -armed militants in the early morning of the great Jewish holiday.

In the comments of Dana Military Commanders on Monday, and they shared with the media on Thursday, the military chief of the headquarters, Lieutenant Herza Halevi, said he had taken responsibility for the military failures.

“I was the commander of the army on October 7th and I have my own responsibility. I also carry the weight of all your responsibility – and I also see that as my own,” said Halevi, who announced the resignation in January and should step down next week.

The findings of the army are in accordance with past conclusions made by officials and analysts. The army published only a summary of the report, and military officials presented her discovery.

“October 7th was a complete failure,” said a military official Associated Press, who spoke, provided anonymity in accordance with the regulations.

The central misconception was that Hamas, who took control of Gaza from the Palestinian administration in 2007, was more interested in managing the territory than the fight against Israel, the investigation determined.

The army also misjudged Hamas’s abilities, has long determined the terrorist group by the US -Ai Israeli government. Military planners imagined that, in the worst case, Hamas could be an invasion of the Earth from to eight border points, a military official told AP. In fact, Hamas had more than 60 attacks.

Intelligence rated after the attack showed that Hamas approached the abolition of the offensive to three earlier opportunities, but delayed for unknown reasons, the official told AP.

The official also said that in hours before the attack there were any signs that something was fine, including when Hamas Fighters transferred their phones to the Israeli network.

The perception that Hamas did not want war -making war makers to take action that could prevent the attack.

“The belief was that the Hamas could be influenced by pressures that would reduce his motivation for war, primarily by improving the living conditions of Gaza’s belt,” the report said. “The Israeli policy towards Gaza was based on defense, stabilization and efforts to prevent Hamas’ military accumulation, a willingness for short periods (ie days) of direct conflict and preparation for the script of escalation.”

Israeli military official said to AP -In an intelligence service shows that Yahya Sinwar, Master of October 7th. October Killed last OctoberHe started planning it as early as 2017.

Since the army without guards is on a holiday weekend, Hamas launched a heavy wave of rockets that enabled thousands of fighters to break through a safety fence or fly over it on hanging sailboats. They threw out surveillance cameras and quickly flooded hundreds of soldiers stationed along the border.

From there, they progressed to key intersections on the highway and attacked troops shipped to the area, including some senior officers, disrupting military command and control, according to another military official, who also spoke with AP, provided anonymity.

The first three hours after the attack, Hamas pierced the fighters on the border communities and the music festival with small resistance. Then most of the 251 hostages were taken and most people were killed, the clerk told AP. The official said that chaos had led to friendly fire incidents, although he said he had not much, without discovering the figure.

It took hours for the army to regain control and days until the area was completely cleared of militants.

According to the first official, the report was to blame the army that she was overly confident in her knowledge and that she had not shown enough doubt about her fundamental concepts and beliefs. The summary said that the key lesson was that Israel could not allow a threat to develop on the border.

She has written several recommendations, including the creation of special units that could be prepared for such surprise and major events, as well as reform in the Department of Military Intelligence, which would encourage “openness, skepticism, listening, learning.”

This did not blame for any individual soldier or officer, but the path to showdown in military and possible dismissals will probably be established.

Some senior officers, apart from Halevi, also resigned, including the former head of military intelligence.