Analysis: Call to dissolve PKK Reshapes Turkiye, Siria Power Dynamics | Syrian war news

The consequences of the invitation of the founder of the Kurdistan Workers (PKK), Abdullah Father, because the group dissolves it, not only in Turkiya, but also in the wider region.

The movement of the Alliance in Syria-Prophet with the recent agreement of the Syrian democratic forces under the guidance of Kurdska (SDF) and the Syrian government-according to the father’s message is not isolated or purely domestic, but offers a key opportunity that could redefine all from Turkish security policies to the future ACT.

In a statement delivered from Turkish in prison in late February, he called on PKK to “convene your congress and make a decision. All groups have to lay their weapons, and PKK should dissolve.”

PKK leadership – from its long -standing command center in Iraqi Mountains Qandil – answered the invitation of father -in -law, proclaiming a one -sided tribute with final dissolution, as well as decisions on disarming and other things that are delayed until the congress can be held in a month or two. Turkiye remains firmly in their demand that all groups associated with PKK, including its Syrian offshoots, must dispel unconditionally.

PKK’s decades have killed more than 40,000 people with Turkiya. In addition to being the leader of the movement, he also led the armed rebellion of the group until his capture in 1999. PKK considers the terrorist organization of Turkiya, the United States and the European Union.

Although he has been fatherly in the past, this is the first time he has called on PKK to stop existence, the reason for the fact that it is probably related to changes in the Kurdish political movements, the Turkish state strategy and the wider regional diverting, especially developing dynamics in Syria.

Removal of the Kurdish ‘Faculty of Fear’

The diminished strategic value of the armed struggle coincided with the increase in Kurdish political actors, weakening the role of PKK as “fear factor” in Turkish politics.

Once instrumental in mobilization of nationalist votes for the ruling Party of Justice and Development (AK Party), the influence of PKK fades that Prokurdic policy gets attraction.

The Democratic Party of the People (HDP) interrupted a new country in June 2015, surpassing a 10 % electoral threshold needed to secure parliamentary presentation-complaints previously managed by the Pro-Courgery Party only by leading independent candidates.

Today, a party that is now known as the equality of the people and the Democratic Party (DEM) plays a major role in the elections because the Kurdish voices are formed by Turkiye’s political landscape.

In accordance with this background, the father -in -law’s call to the dissolution of PKK is an effort to expand the space for the Kurdish political representation within the democratic system.

Kurdish political mobilization through political parties has become more powerful and influential than the armed struggle.

Growth has not been imposed because the continuation is imposed on state limitations.

For example, Selahattin Demirtas, a former HDP leader and a former presidential candidate, remains closed, and Kurdish politicians and activists who have accused the Government of being close to confronting PKK according to sharp punishments under the “Terror” laws.

After the municipal elections in 2024, the government once again appointed guardians in some Kurdish municipalities, preventing the selected mayors to take office to DEM parties.

These limitations, however, can start to facilitate the gradual normalization of the pro-cudish policy, which could appear as a result of removing the “terrorist” labels from the wider movement and the construction of a new narrative that positions pro-Curd representatives as recognized political actors.

Turkiy’s stake

For AK Party, consolidation of election support requires a sensitive balance between resolving the Kurdish requests – and acquiring these votes – and maintaining Turkish nationalist support.

If this initiative to interview PKK was exclusively led by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan without the involvement of the leader of the National Frequent Party (MHP) Devlet Bahceli, who has long opposed any solution except military, nationalist opposition would be far more extreme.

If Bahceli urged the father-in-law to turn to the parliament and advocate “right to hope”-a course that supports the release of individuals, including father-in-law, who have served 25 years and participated in dialogue with the DEM figures he previously labeled as “terrorists”, the G

A successful peace process could help re-establish support for foreigners among the Kurdish voters who turned away from the party from the collapse of the Turkiye-PKK peace process in 2015 and the government turning to Turkish nationalism-like and attract a new generation of Kurdish voters.

On the other hand, the opposition of Turkiya remains a savage map with such development. Hard fractions within the Government and nationalist circles are likely to resist any observed concessions of the Pro-Curd political actors.

From the outside, the “Kurdish question” has long been an obstacle in Turkiye’s external relations, especially with Western allies and the EU, for which Turkiye remains a candidate country.

Concern about the rights and freedoms, undergoing the Kurdish rights and political representation, the prison of Kurdish politicians and Western support of Kurdish groups fighting ISIL (ISIS) in Syria, all contributed to the tensions in the external relations of Turkiya.

By proactive management of this transition, Ankara could be framed as an architect of the Kurdish political normalization, strengthening its position both regionally and internationally.

In the meantime, the reality that neither Turkiy nor PKK can have an absolute victory military becomes clearer. A decline in active conflict within Turkiya also transformed public perception.

Turkiye’s military operations in Syria-Eufrati Shield (2016-2017), Olive Branch (2018) and Peace Spring (2019)-were translated by the primary battlefield from Turkiya border areas in northern Syria, where conflicts between the Turkish Syrian national army (dreams) and Syrian Kurds continue.

This strategy not only established zones under the control of Turkish Turkish, but also changed the geography of the conflict, reducing direct threats to Turkiye, at the same time intensifying struggles for power in Syrian areas such as Afrin, Ras al-Ain and Tal Abyad.

However, the dissolution of PKK is not a completed contract, and the opposition parties, especially the Republican People’s Party (CHP), which desperately wants to end the 23-year-old AK Party Rule, remain hesitant to support the initiative.

Although CHP officially supports the peaceful solution of the “Kurdish Question”, it is skeptical of the process that runs Erdogan’s government, not knowing what can take place in closed door negotiations.

Furthermore, CHP is cautious about legitimacy to a process that could strengthen the appeal of the AK Party among Kurdish voters, especially with elections in the future.

For now, he has accepted the attitude of waiting and viewing, because the only known intention of PKK is to dissolve, not its actual mechanisms.

Syrian equation

The father’s complaint reflects a wider shift because unannounced armed groups throughout the region are facing growing pressure to adapt to survival and legitimacy.

In northern Syria, the strategic priority of the Democratic Union (PYD) party (PYD) and its armed wing-international defense unit (YPG), which is the main force in the SDF supported US-U-U-Cemetery of their territorial and political position.

Set in 2003 as PKK Offshoot, Pyd entered Northern Syria in himself, and in military insults, the aimed by Ankara and Ankara, which is supported by Ankara, in Syria, such as a dream.

Fatherwater is perhaps motivated by the hope that the dissolved PKK will result in smaller direct conflicts between Turkiya and Pyd, which could help PYD retain the level of self-assessment and rights within the new Syrian state and the Constitution.

An important step in this direction occurred on Monday when the SDF signed an agreement in Damascus with the temporary President Ahmed al-Shara to combine their forces with the Syrian army and cooperate on several economic, social and political fronts.

Whether it will be enough for Turkiye to give up in search of the SDF depends on the details of the agreement and its implementation. So far, the agreement has been supported by Erdogan, who emphasized that the complete implementation of the agreement will serve the Syrian security and stability and benefit of all Syrian.

Public statements by Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan have previously shown that Turkiye wants to shape the conditions of acceptance of PYD reconfigured Syrian frames, urging the removal of foreign PKK elements, dismantling the military leadership of the YPG -a integrating Pyd into the Syrian state without any weapons or terters.

What is likely to follow?

The resolution of the “Kurdish Question” could improve Turkiya’s diplomatic influence, especially with European and American actors who are critical of his policies against Kurds in the country and in neighboring countries.

A sustainable procedure can also facilitate tension with Iraq and Syria, where Turkiye’s operations against the Kurdish group caused friction. This would further strengthen security and economic cooperation with Baghdad and the new government in Damascus.

Although legislative steps will play a key role in facilitating this transition, a well -defined plan of the road with legal, political and social adjustments is needed.

The focus will soon move to the future of PKK Fighter. According to the intensification of a public debate in Turkiye, there are several potential pathways.

Some may obtain legal support for amnesty and reintegration. Others can be absorbed into legitimate Kurdish political structures, and some higher leaders can move to third countries, and their current base in Iraq is a probably destination.

Ultimately, the sustainability of this process will be determined by significant democratic reforms, the spread of cultural and political rights, the protection of civil freedoms and the mitigation of the path to a new democratic constitutional framework as the basis of a higher political order.

However, based on the Turkiye declarations, the current vision does not include any of these main reforms. In order for the dissolution of PKK to happen without these fundamental changes, the question remains. For their fighters, the legal framework will be the need for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.

While some figures within the demons of advocates of the rapid procedure of consolidation of their political position and achievement of gains for their voters, the Party politicians could even be motivated by election concerns, seeking resolution to neutralize the tensions without giving deep structural concessions.

PKK’s interruption of fire is noted the first step, but its long-term sustainability depends on how to institutionalize it, which could not provide a purely tactical or urgent settlement.

At the same time, it is crucial to recognize that the peace process cannot be built on uncompromising requirements or the idealized maps of the path without friction.

Sustainable peace requires pragmatic solutions, gradual steps and acceptance that negotiations will include failures, competitive interests and the necessity of mutual concessions.