What does the report of Israeli military failures say on October 7th? | Israel-Palestine News of Conflict

Israeli military investigation into a series of errors in guidance and during the attack guided by Hamas on October 7, 2023, admitted that the “complete failure of” the army was to prevent it.

In what investigators say he was a very coordinated attack that lasted the years of planning, a group of fighters led by Hamas broke out from Gaza and attacked the Israeli community and a music festival along the border.

A total of 1,139 people were killed during the attack and about 250 trapped.

The report describes in detail the history of misconceptions about the risk that represents Hamas and the refusal of accepting the warning sign of the attack on the attack, as well as the inability of the army to coordinate the answer.

While the report was naked by many omissions of the Israeli army on October 7, 2023, similar investigations into political failures were repeatedly blocked by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his right -wing coalition.

How did the Israel’s army underestimate Hamas?

The report says that the army has a decade of “fundamental misunderstandings” of Hamas, leading senior officers to underestimate the abilities and intentions of the group.

Military planners assumed that Hamas did not represent a significant threat to Israel and that he was uninterested in a high -scale war, according to researchers.

Planners also believed that the Hamas tunnel networks were significantly degraded, and any cross -border threat was easily prevented by the Israeli barrier of high -tech separation.

Despite the warning signs, such as the unusual activities of Hamas fighters, the Israeli authorities insisted that the group focused on maintaining the management within Gaza and that they would attack Israel with a rocket, not a major invasion based.

They also misjudged Hamas’s leader Yahya Sinwar, assuming that he was “not interested in the wider war.”

What warning did Intelligence Israel ignored before the attack?

In hours that led to the attack, the report said, the Israeli army or neglected or misinterpreted several indications that the attack was inevitable.

In the evening before the attack, several women’s insights warned their commanders of an unusual activity along the border. In addition, officials reported to the mass activation of Israeli SIM cards who are known to be in the hands of Hamas fighters, as well as suspicious movements in Hamas’s rocket schedule;

However, the commanders instead relied on what they said they were “convincing signs” that Hamas simply ran military exercise.

How did Israeli intelligence misinterpret events?

According to the report, Hamas began to consider the invasion of October 2023 as early as 2016.

However, the Israeli intelligence community rejected such reports as “unrealistic”, believing that Hamas had distracted Israeli response to the uprising in May 2021, When Israel killed 232 people in Gaza.

The Israeli army has since realized that Hamas decided as early as April 2022 to launch his attack. By September of that year, 85 percent were ready, and on May 2023 he set up on October 7th as a date.

What were the Israeli operational failures that day?

Many.

The army was unprepared for the attack, investigators discovered, and the troop deployment was significantly delayed, allowing Palestinian fighters to inflict without current resistance.

In one kibbut, Nir Oz, who the army was accused of leaving, one survivor later said to the Israeli headquarters head that the last Palestinian fighter left long before the first Israeli soldier entered.

Estimates of fighter numbers were also wide tags, and the planners were wildly underestimated by the extent of the attack.

Later, it was determined that 5,600 fighters had crossed the border in three waves, a backed by a barge of about 4,000 rockets and 57 drones.

As a result, the Gaza Israeli division was just over 700 soldiers overwhelmed and remained “defeated” for hours, and the military planners were not aware of this while coordinated their answer.

Only about 12 o’clock [10:00 GMT]When reinforcements began, that gauze division began to act.

The report also noted that the Israeli air forces fought that they distinguished the Hamas fighters and Israeli civilians. While the report avoids entering into detail, the army accepted that some Israelis was killed by a friendly fire.

At the same time, investigators discovered, many aircraft were deployed against the homes of the elderly commanders of Hamas in Gaza, instead of defending civilians and soldiers who were attacked.

Did the commanders order the Hannibal directive?

According to several Israeli newspapers, yes, many civilians died as a result.

Directive Hannibal, which orders that the Israeli army employs all possible force to prevent the Israeli fighters to be trapped, including the murder of anyone around them, ordered during the attack, Israeli everyday, Haaretza reported.

As such, the orders were published on October 7 to the Israeli forces to prevent Hamas from returning to Gaza with prisoners “at all costs”, which included the murder of civilian non-bodies.

Some of the pilots flying across the battlefield were reportedly not willing to act on the directive and occasionally stayed from cracking, with concern about the hitting civilians.

Still, subsequent investigations have shown that several civilians killed as a result of Hannibal’s Directive.

One, Ephrat Katz, killed The helicopter fire as the Hamas fighters transported it to Gaza.

In Kibbutz Be’eri, the Israeli tank fired two shells into a house that is known to hold over a dozen prisoners, including 12-year-old twins. Only two prisoners survived.

What are the key endeavors?

Prior to the attack, key warnings, such as increased activities of combat activities and intelligence reports, have been neglected or misinterpreted.

The Israeli army estimates were underestimated by the proportions of the attack, with poor communication and poor exchange of intelligence among the commanders who added failures

The Israeli army responded slowly to the attack of the guided Hamas, and the reinforcements were too slow on arrival.

No similar investigation was conducted in the Government’s actions before and during the attack.