IDF publishes part of its report on what happened on October 7th.

AND Israeli defense forces (IDF) published most of the investigation of what happened on October 7, 2023 and in the days that led to the Hamas massacre. While the initial investigation began in November 2023, leaving the IDF chief, Lieutenant Herzi Halevi ordered all units to start probes in March 2024. The IDF refrained from offering the recommendations in its report, saying that they would be left to the arrival of the IDF staff, general (res.) Eyal Zamir, who will enter the role of next week.

October 7th did not end. A year later, 101 hostages are still holding in Gaza

1st October 7. In numbers

According to IDF estimates, 5,000-5,600 militants infiltrated Israel in three waves. Meanwhile, 4,696 rockets and mortars were shot according to Israel. The attacks left 829 Israeli civilians, 76 foreign nationals and 415 security staff of the dead. Additionally, 251 hostages They were taken to Gaza’s belt.

“The fundamental failure was the result of failure in understanding Hamas’s intentions and willingness to a wide attack of surprise,” said IDF’s senior officials in the report.

2. Hamas Attrat Time Line

The Hamas attacks were not executed, according to IDF, the planning began almost seven years before the massacre, with the formation of “Basic Concept” in November 2016 and “Initial Plan” in July 2017. The Hamas plan was approved in July 2019, and the operational plan was erected in August 2021, and the Terber was early established.

Idf says Hamas considered numerous dates for attacks, including September 16, which was Rosh Hashanah, Jewish New Year and September 25, Yom Kippur, Jewish Reconciliation Day. Finally, on October 7, 2023, which coincided with the Jewish holiday Simchat Torah, which signifies the end and restart of the tora.

Referring to the time lane of Israel’s war against Hamas after OCT. 7

3. A complete time lane of October 7

The attack, according to IDF, began to form in the early hours of October 7th. Hamas allegedly began to prepare his strength at about 11:00 pm on October 6, after spending most of the day, putting them at the awake and gathering of weapons, and he performed Brifings until 4:00 in October 7th.

The infiltration itself began with the first wave at 6:29 o’clock when 1,154 members of Hamas’s Nukhba attacked, broke the safety barrier between Gaza and Israel. The IDF declared an extraordinary state at 6:43, and in 7:10 pm Israeli Air Force (IAF) followed the suit.

Between 7:00 and 9:00, 3,400 militants were within the Israeli territory. In addition, just before 8:00 in the morning, military commander Hamas Mohammed Deif invited civilians in Gaza to join the attacks. The estimation states that after 9:00 am, the attackers took advantage of IDF failures to take advantage of further attack. Some were allegedly planning deeper into the Israeli territory.

Several “main attacks” Idf stopped at about 1:00 pm, but there were still hundreds of attackers in Israel at 15:00 IDF says he gained control of some communities and surrounding areas by 9:00 pm, but dozens were present around midnight.

“We did not predict that Hamas would be able to be so brutal in his struggles,” the high -ranking officials of IDF wrote.

4. IDF -O’s wrong assessment of threats

Much of the IDF was a focus on Iran and Hezbollah before the attack on October 7, and Hamas was defined at the time as a secondary threat. In addition, the IDF assumed that it could contain Hamas’ activity because it acted “gradually improvement of the existing reality” with the aim of eliminating the terrorist group.

The IDF also believed that “Hamas did not want a war as a whole”, which led to Israel to conclude that the large scale invasion was unlikely. In estimation, IDF says Hamas used the Israeli perception of the situation and used it to its advantage.

Another great misconception pointed out in the assessment is the opinion of IDF that the main threat of Hamas were rockets and mortars that fired from Gaza. This is combined with relying on the defense tactics and barrier, as well as a decrease in the trunk on the border of Israel-Gaza would lead to a disaster.

5. Intelligence failures

The Israeli intelligence administration did not fully understand or analyze the Intel that she had on Hamas and his intentions. This apparently also applies to the perception of the IDF -Ao “axis” and its views of Israel. The IDF says that during the examination he found deeply rooted systemic questions with the Administration of Intelligence and Culture.

Since 2018, the Intelligence Directorate has collected information about the Hamas concept for a major attack on Israel. However, the plan was considered impossible and it was considered to reflect Hamas’s long -term goals.

In August 2021. Intel on Hamas’s military wing He described a plan for a large -scale attack on the Israeli community and military branch around the gaza belt. Intelligence officials failed to establish a connection between this new Intel and what he collected in 2018.

Intelligence received in the months that led until October 7th indicated that Hamas performed raid exercises. This obviously changed the evaluation of the elite unit of 8200 Israel on the situation, but this was reportedly not pressed with higher guidance.

The Israeli army finds bodies of 3 hostages in Gaza killed in OCT. 7 Music Festival

6. “Early Signs” missed

In the evening of October 6, 2023. The Israeli SIM cards were activated inside the gauze. However, it was not warned as it happened before. These same SIM cards would later allow Hamas militants to communicate after crossing the border to Israel. That night there was an indication that the Hamas leaders met. However, according to IDF estimated, none of these facts was enough to change the mindset of the Gazi intelligence administration, so there was no warning.
There were also indications of both the usual and unusual Hamas activities that evening. The investigation revealed that there are intelligence sources that could be used overnight to improve information that was not used. However, the IDF claims that the intelligence directive changed the situation assessment, there would be greater warnings for the localized Hamas offensive, but not for the comprehensive war.

7. Estimated IAF -a

IF has been found to have met and even exceeded defined standards for readiness, except for two cases due to heavy rocket fires. However, these standards did not align with what should be prepared for a great attack of surprise. The IDF concluded that there was “significant difficulties” that distinguish between troops, civilians and IDF terrorists.

While IAF hit the key Hamas command centersThe IDF admits that even in its viewing of strikes it is challenging to determine if it could have been a more effective strike given the circumstances.

However, it was noted that the IDF was not prepared for anything like a brutal massacre on October 7th.
“We were dependent on precise intelligence and information we received as commanders and did not consider other scenarios. This failure will forever be carved in our memories, and we will never forget and will never forget,” the IDF senior officials wrote.

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In his conclusion, the IDF notes that the assessment of the situation in Gaza and as far as Hamas was concerned was so rooted in the institution that there was no deep discussion of alternative capabilities. In addition, he now says that it was “inaccurate” to try “the conflict to manage” Hamas and, in the future, removal of threats needs a priority.

The estimate also deals with the possibility of a future attack, saying that the preventive strategy will be key.