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Your guide to what the 2024 US election means for Washington and the world
The writer is a former head of MI6 and British ambassador to the UN
We often think about The Middle East as it was built in the Arab world. Baghdad and Damascus were historical centers of power. In the 20th century, Cairo and Beirut became regional cultural capitals until they collapsed and their influence was taken over by the oil and gas wealth of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf.
Today, it is striking that three of the most assertive and powerful countries in the region—Israel, Turkey, and Iran—are non-Arab nations. Each is led by an aged war horse. Benjamin Netanyahu has been Israel’s prime minister for 17 of the last 28 years. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has been in power in Turkey for almost 22 years, and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has been the supreme leader of Iran for 35 years. Like the Bourbons in France 200 years ago, they learn nothing and forget nothing.
After the humiliating calamity of Hamas’ brutal attack on October 7, 2023, Israel is back. Its armed forces and intelligence services turned the tables, not only on Hamas, but also on Hezbollah and their sponsors in Iran. In doing so, Netanyahu ignored the advice of Israel’s closest friends and showed little regard for protecting civilian life. Long-term support for Israel has weakened in the west, but its main enemies have been severely weakened.
Israel proved to be the new Sparta—a small nation with unparalleled military power. But its politicians reject the idea that a political solution with the Palestinians is needed if the Jewish people are to enjoy lasting peace and security. Israel has no plan for Gaza other than an indefinite occupation, unless it involves the indefinite expulsion of the Palestinians there into Egypt and the parallel annexation of as much of the occupied West Bank as possible. One prediction we can make with confidence, unfortunately, is that an independent Palestinian state will be no closer in a year than it is now.
With the beginning of the new year, Israel’s attention is focused on Iran, which was the big loser in 2024. Khamenei is becoming visibly weaker, physically and politically. The main candidate to succeed him is now his son Mojtaba. Second-generation autocrats come to power based on privileges and rights. They don’t bear the scars of battle or learn the hard lessons their fathers taught them. Hafez al-Assad was a ruthless leader of Syria, but he knew the limits of power and when to negotiate. His son Bashar had none of those skills. The result was even greater brutality and, over time, the fall of the regime.
The experience of losing a Syrian ally should make the Iranian military wary of a dynastic legacy. They will try to ensure that the new supreme leader is not all-powerful within the regime. But the new leaders of stagnant autocracies can bring surprises. Deng Xiaoping and Mikhail Gorbachev are obvious examples. For Iran, the transformation of Saudi Arabia under Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is closer. Each recognized the vulnerability of their country and sought economic and political a strategy, usually involving some openness to the outside world, to prop up the autocratic system for decades to come. This seems unlikely in Iran, but should not be ruled out.
A weakened regime presents an opportunity for new negotiations, even if Khamenei Sr. falters for another year or two. Donald Trump might prefer a political deal to participating in Netanyahu’s preferred military option of destroying Iran’s nuclear facilities. Israel will argue that Tehran will continue to negotiate while they secretly move toward nuclear weapons, the strategic case of which is now even more compelling for Iran. These are valid concerns. Khamenei also distrusts America even more than American politicians distrust Iran. It may take new leadership in Tehran before Iran changes course.
A very welcome surprise in 2024 was the fall of the Assad regime and the opening of the way to a better future for the Syrian people. Turkey, like Israel, was a winner last year, but it too has problems taking advantage of new opportunities. Erdoğan appears to be viewing Syria through the distorted prism of the Kurdish issue, which will make it difficult for Syrian opposition leaders to come together and create a new constitution that recognizes the diversity — religious and ethnic — of their country.
Erdoğan, the remarkable survivor, built Turkish power across the region and Africa. He showed that the philosophy of political Islam can be successful and does not have to lead to an Islamic state and strict Sharia law. In this sense, he can be a model for Ahmed al-Sharaa, the leader of the Islamist group HTS that now holds power in Damascus.
There is a lesson here for Western capitals, and for Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. We are rightly wary of al-Sharaa’s extremist background. However, the path of young radicals from political violence to national leadership is well trodden. The diplomatic task ahead is to maximize the chances of success in Syria by boldly lifting sanctions, lifting bans on terrorism and doing everything we can to support the Syrian opposition to rally.
The instinct in Western capitals seems to be to slowly pay off the rope and resist the Islamists on ideological grounds. But it is a path that will make it more likely that we will end up either with fragmentation, as in Libya, or with a new dictator, as in Tunisia. Western countries must also avoid the mistakes of the Bourbons.
