On Thursday, the Israeli army published the first discoveries from its internal investigations of a colossal military and intelligence failure of October 7, 2023, describing that the High officers largely underestimated Hamas and then misinterpreted the wound warning that a great attack was coming.
Studies have tried to answer a question that confused Israel from that day, when thousands of armed armed attackers overcame Israeli communities, army and music festival: Where was the army?
Israeli military officials said they spent tens of thousands of hours examining the military collection of intelligence data and his subsequent response to the attack, in which about 1,200 people, mostly civilians, were killed, and 250 taken hostage, in the most deadly day for Jews than Holocaust. Survivors waited for long hours to save the soldiers after the attack that began in the early hours of the Jewish rest.
Reporters the day before the publication of some of their initial findings, Israeli military officials, who could not be appointed military rules, suggested that failure was from the wrong assumptions about Hamas’s abilities and intentions, as well as what some military officials called “addiction” in precise intelligences.
The wrong view of Hamas was mostly unquestionable within the Israeli intelligence circles and the older command, which led to a series of failures. They included a chaotic military response in the first hours of the attack after the troops were arranged along the border quickly overcrowded, and the military southern command and gauze division was flooded.
Findings military and intelligence failureS mainly matching detailed Investigations of local and international newspaper media. But the army now represents its own version of the event for responsibility, said Israeli military officials.
The army did not coordinate its investigations with other bodies, such as the Shin Bet Bet Agency for Internal Security, which is also responsible for collecting intelligence data in Gaza or the police.
He also did not deal with government policies and decisions that led to the attack. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has repeatedly said that he will answer difficult questions after the war, rejecting a wide public demand for an independent commission that may assign personal responsibility.
The internal investigation of the army were not aimed at finding individual responsibilities, the officials said. That may come later, they said, under the incoming military chief of the Israeli army, Eyal Zamir. In early March, he replaced Lieutenant Herzi Halevi. They said that the main goal was to learn lessons from the debacle.
General Halevi accepted personal responsibility for the failure of the army under his command to protect the Israelites and announced He left last month. Aharon Haliva, a former chief of military intelligence of Israel, resigned in 2024, as well as head of the Israeli military brigade of Gaza. In the coming weeks and months, more residues are expected.
Some of the key army findings, as the officials set up, include:
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Hamas has been deceived by Israel in recent years, thinking that he is interested in calming and improving economic conditions in Gaza. The army primarily focused its resources on Iran and the Lebanese militant group of Hezbollah, both incredible enemies.
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There was nothing improvised in the attack. The military acknowledged the reports that he found Hamas’s Operational Invasion Plan Code called “Jericho Wall“Until 2022, which he says was initially conceived in 2016. Hamas had time to build the necessary force, unknown to Israel. The document approximately 40 pages is described, a point per point, a type of devastating invasion that came on October 7th. In the written summary of some major findings, the army said that “the information was generally misinterpreted as an unrealistic or impracticable plan.”
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Before October 7, the army estimated that the threat represented by Hamas represents a limited number of raids in four to eight points along the border, not dozens seen during the attack and that each such attack would include dozens of militants, not thousands.
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There was an Israeli assumption that any major movement in Hamas would precede a warning of early intelligence, but there was no previous intelligence of an attack planned for October 7th and there was no tactical warning. As a result, only regular forces are arranged for border defense, as usual for Saturday, which was also a Jewish vacation.
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Some early signals of something an irregular event in Gaza were received during the night between October 6 and 7, such as the activation of dozens of cell phones equipped with Israeli SIM cards. But Israeli officials also found enough convincing signs to take over to existing prejudices of Hamas’s abilities, the army said. (Initial abstract did not specifically address warnings lower level army Strange activities in the months that led to the attack on October 7th, which seems to have been rejected.)
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The attack followed in three waves. First, in the initial half -hour, about 1,200 Hamas commandos included. The second, from about 7am to 9 o’clock, consisted of about 2000 more commandos and armed people from other armed organizations. The third was mostly a civilian mob by which Hamas’ military commander persuaded.
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Only about 1pm, the Israeli military headquarters and commanders on Earth managed to compile a good picture of the entire attack scale. The initial response of armed civilians, officers and soldiers who rushed to battle themselves was enough to knock on the first few hours. Three brigade commanders and several battalion commanders and a company were killed. It was until the night of October 9th that the army stated that it had regained operational control over border areas.
The army has started in recent days to present their discoveries to the residents of the communities that are attacked. The reactions were mixed, and some residents said that the inquiries dealing with their villages were asking more questions than answered, and others said they had gained a new insight.
Amir Tibon, an Israeli journalist and a resident of one of the villages, Nahal Oz, praised a military investigation as “depth and serious.”
He said “he felt that it had touched all the difficult points, without any washing.” But he added that it was basically a tactical report that could not replace the need for a complete independent investigative commission.
Mr. Tibon, author of the recent book “Gate Gaza”, about the temptation of his family on October 7th and the wider Israeli-Palestinian conflict, said that the military investigation provided him with some new details of what he described as “the heroic battle of Nahal Oz defense”, though not much.
One thing he found out, he said, there were three waves of attacker entered his village, not two, as he had previously thought, and that the third arrived around 11am
“It shows absolutely madness how long it took for the army to be organized and send a great force to save us,” he said.
The attack under the guidance of Hamas was launched by a devastating 15-month-old war, while Israel sought to eradicate Hamas in Gaza, killing more than 48,000 Palestinians, most of them women, children and the elderly, according to the Gaza Health Ministry, who are no different between fighters and civilians. The war left most of the enclave in the ruins and spread to a broader regional conflict.
