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Your guide to what the 2024 US election means for Washington and the world
The writer is a professor at Georgetown University and a senior advisor at The Asia Group. He was a staff member of the US National Security Council from 2009-2015
If Donald Trump’s China policy is defined uncertainty and contradictionXi Jinping’s strategy is defined by clarity and decisiveness. The Chinese president’s approach to the newly elected US president is no secret. Since the election, Beijing has been quite clear about its positions and possible responses.
Xi plans to not only respond, but also take advantage of Trump’s moves. During Trump’s first term, Beijing was quick to respond. He is determined not to let it happen again. Xi is well into his preparations and has signaled it.
Most Chinese analysts were not surprised by Trump’s election, linking his return to a global tide of populism and nationalism. Beijing believes it now understands Trump’s gamesmanship and can manipulate his administration. China’s confidence is based on the conclusion – correct or not – that China in 2025 is different from 2017, and so is the US and the world.
Many Chinese argue that Xi is politically stronger and the economy more confident and resilient, even amid recent challenges. Chinese analysts see the US economy as more fragile and US politics deeply divided. Geopolitically, Beijing sees American influence waning across the Global South and Asia — and support for China’s vision is growing.
Xi has already signaled that he will treat his ties with Trump as purely business, albeit Don Corleone-style. He won’t embrace Trump personally and will fight back early and hard to gain an advantage. Beijing effectively declined Trump’s invitation to Xi to attend the inauguration.
But Beijing is also signaling it wants dialogue and is open to a deal to avoid new tariffs. However, the Chinese, who prefer to use back channels, struggle to find the right one to understand what Trump “really” wants. Beijing’s basic assumption is that Washington and its allies will remain hostile to China for the foreseeable future. Therefore, Xi is open to negotiations because he wants some breathing room on the economic front, so that China can gather its strength to compete in the long term.
Beijing remains concerned that the Trump team will focus on deeper economic disengagement, regime change in China and support for Taiwan independence, all as means of containing and destabilizing China. Therefore, Xi’s four “red lines” in a November meeting with President Joe Biden in Peru in a clear message to the new administration.
Beijing’s planned responses to Trump can be divided into three groups: retaliation, adaptation and diversification. Mirroring US policy, Beijing has in recent years created a series of export controls, investment restrictions and regulatory investigations that can hurt US companies. Beijing is unable to match tariff for tariff, so it will seek to impose costs in ways that inflict maximum pain. For China, failure to retaliate would signal weakness in the country and only embolden Trump.
This has already started. In late 2024, Beijing blocked exports of critical minerals used to make chips to the U.S., clamped down on the supply chain for U.S.-made drones, threatened to blacklist a high-profile U.S. apparel company, and launched an antitrust investigation into Nvidia. By taking such actions, Beijing is checking its options and creating future negotiating advantages.
China’s second strategy is adaptation. Beginning in the fall of 2023, Beijing began strong fiscal and monetary stimulus to help businesses and now consumers. This policy change is creating some positive, albeit uneven, effects. It was much needed, but its scope and nature were also developed with a possible trade war in mind.
Beijing’s third strategy involves expanding its economic ties. A unilateral reduction in tariffs on imports from partners outside the US is being discussed. During his trip to Peru, Xi inaugurated a deep-water port that could reshape China’s trade with Latin America, a key non-American source of food, energy and minerals. In late 2024, Xi also participated in meetings with the leaders of 10 major international economic organizations for the first time. His message was clear: China will be a leading force for global economic stability, prosperity and openness and opposes all forms of protectionism.
A lot could go wrong. Beijing’s self-confidence matches Trump’s team. Both sides believe they have the upper hand, that they can impose more costs and endure more pain. The stage is set for a complicated, destabilizing dynamic that, at best, results in a ceasefire. And only on economic issues, not on Taiwan, the South China Sea, technological competition or the modernization of nuclear forces. The Cold War is starting to look strange in comparison.
